In the old, familiar fashion, mounting US casualties in Iraq have mobilized increasing public doubts about the war. Now, more than half the American people believe that the invasion of Iraq was a mistake. They're right. But it would also be a mistake now to pull out, start pulling out, or set a date to pull out. Instead we need a strategy to create a stable democratizing and peaceful state in Iraq – a strategy the Administration has failed to develop and articulate.

From the outset of the American post-invasion efforts, we needed a three-pronged strategy – diplomatic, political, and military. Iraq sits geographically on the fault-line between Shia and Sunni Islam – and for the mission to succeed we will have to be the catalyst for regional cooperation. Iraq cannot be "isolated from its neighbors and tensions in the region. We needed to engage Iraq's neighbors to insure that a stable, democratizing Iraq was not a threat to them, to isolate Iraq from outside supplies, leadership, and manpower, and to gain from them resources and support to alleviate the burdens on the US.

Unfortunately, the Administration didn't see the need for a diplomatic track. Its scattershot diplomacy in the region – threatening some of Iraq's neighbors with a variety of economic and diplomatic measures and allusions to further military action, expounding aims in the region that sound grandiose, and to many of those who live there, naïve and even somewhat imperialistic, failing to reinforce the US efforts with more culturally and linguistically capable regional allies, and turning away other assistance which might have made US leadership less obtrusive – have been ill-advised and counterproductive. The diplomatic failure magnified the difficulties facing the political and military elements of US strategy by contributing to the increasing infiltration of jihadists, the surprisingly resilient support of the insurgency, and the underlying political difficulties of bringing together representative Iraqi elements

On the political track, aiming for a legitimate, democratic Iraqi government was essential, but the US was far too slow in mobilizing Iraqi political action. A wasted first year encouraged a rise in sectarian militias and the emergence of strong fractionating forces. And even within the last year, as John Negroponte moved to Washington, months went by without an American Ambassador in Iraq. Today, political development among the Iraqis is hampered not only by the lack of security but also by American efforts to promote the establishment of a democracy without adequate development of the underlying social and cultural prerequisites, such as security and an infrastructure program that can reliably deliver gas, electricity and jobs.

Meanwhile, on the military track, security on the ground is poor, not only in terms of suicide bombing but more importantly, in terms of protection of life and property for ordinary Iraqis. The US armed forces still haven't received the resources, restructuring and guidance adequate for the magnitude of the task. Why, in June, 2005, over two year into the mission of training Iraqi forces, was the President announcing such "new steps" as partnering with Iraqi units, establishing "transition teams" to work with Iraqi units, or training Iraqi Ministries to conduct anti-terrorist operations? There's nothing new about any of this – just standard nation-building doctrine which we used in Vietnam. Where are the thousands of trained linguists that we need? Where are the flexible, well-resourced, military-led infrastructure development programs to win "hearts and minds?" Where are the smart operations and adequate numbers of forces – US, coalition, or Iraqi –to strengthen control over the borders?

With each passing month other intervening factors compound the difficulties and probably reduce the chances for the mission in Iraq to succeed. The election of an Iranian hardliner makes dialogue with Iran more difficult. Ineffective dealings with Syria probably reduces Assad's leverage in controlling jihadist infiltration into Iraq. Fractionating forces within Iraq have grown stronger, and Iraq's economic infrastructure more fragile. Iraqi patience is wearing thin amidst the continuing violence and hardship in Baghdad. And the apparently growing flow of jihadists in and out of Iraq not only testifies to an increasingly sophisticated insurgency but also a new source of training journeymen to fight against us in the global war on terror. So urgent modification of the strategy is required, before it is too late to do anything other than withdraw..

Adding a diplomatic track to the strategy is a must. The US should form a standing conference of Iraq's neighbors, complete with committees dealing with all the regional economic and political issues, including trade, travel, cross-border infrastructure projects, and, of course, cutting off the infiltration of jihadists. Iraq's neighbors should be asked to assist. This will also provide a better opportunity for meaningful back-door discussions of Iran's nuclear program, Syria's interests in Lebanon, and Turkish interaction with the Kurds in Iraq. The US should tone down its raw rhetoric for US-style democracy as an answer to all problems and instead listen more carefully to the many voices within the region. A public US declaration forswearing permanent bases in Iraq would also be helpful in engaging both regional and Iraqi support at this point.

On the political side, the timeline for the agreements on the Constitution are less important than the substance. It is up to American leadership to help engineer a compromise that will avoid the "red lines" of the respective factions and leave in place a state that both we and the neighbors can support. So, no Kurdish vote on independence; a restricted role for Islam, and limited autonomy in the south. And no private militias.

In addition, the US needs a legal mandate from the government to provide additional civil assistance and advice - along with additional US civilian personnel aimed at strengthening the institutions of government. Three month in-country tours should be replaced by a minimum two year stay for civilian advisors and technical experts. Key ministries must be reinforced, provincial governments made functional, a system of justice trained and established, and the rule of law promoted at the local levels. With the majority of Iraqis having known no other leader than Saddam Hussein, there will be a continuing need for assistance in institutional development, leadership training, and international monitoring for years to come, and all of this must be made palatable to Iraqi sovereignty. Hand-in-glove are the requirements for infrastructure repair, job creation, and economic development without which no government will be safe from an insurgent force. Monies promised for reconstruction simply must be committed and projects moved forward, especially in those areas along the border and where the insurgency has the greatest potential..

On the military side, the vast effort underway to train an Army must be matched by efforts to train police and local justices. Countries as far away as Canada, France and Germany should be engaged to assist. Gulf states should also provide observers and technical assistance. In military terms, striking at insurgents is necessary but insufficient – instead, military and security operations must return primarily to the tried and true methods of counterinsurgency – winning the hearts and minds of the populace through civic action, small scale economic development, and positive daily interactions. Ten thousand Arab Americans with full language proficiency should be recruited to assist as interpreters. A more successful effort must be made to control jihadist infiltration into the country by a combination of outposts, patrols, and reaction forces reinforced by high technology means. Over time, American forces should be pulled back into reserve roles and phased out.

The growing chorus of voices demanding a pull-out should seriously alarm the Bush Administration. For President Bush and his team are repeating the failure of Vietnam – failing to craft a realistic and effective policy, and in its place, simply demanding that the American people show resolve. Resolve alone isn't enough to mend a flawed approach. If the Administration won't adopt a winning strategy, then the American people will be justified in demanding that the Administration bring our troops home.
 

Original Plan
November 6, 2003

When the President flew out to the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln and posed under the banner that read: "Mission Accomplished," he made it clear he did not understand the scope of the mission. We need a success strategy. Only success can honor the sacrifice of so many American men and women; it is only success that will allow Iraq to stand on its own; and it is only success that will allow our soldiers to come home. Early exit means retreat or defeat. Wes Clark has a plan to internationalize the reconstruction, counter the terrorists' guerilla war more effectively, and give Iraqis a greater stake in our own success.

What Do We Do Now?

Wes Clark believes we need to clearly define our mission in Iraq by deciding what constitutes success. Our mission is to create a secure, stable Iraq with a representative government. Only this will make America more secure and enable our troops to come home. Success means that Iraq is strong enough to sustain itself without outside forces but is no longer a threat to its neighbors; that representative government has taken root so Iraq can be a model for democratic hope in the Middle East; and that Iraqi society and the Iraqi economy are healthy enough so that Al Qaeda cannot recruit there.

Wes Clark's strategy for Iraq is guided by the following principles:

1. End the American monopoly. From the beginning, the Administration has insisted on exclusive control of the Iraqi reconstruction and occupation. This has cost us the financial and military support of other nations and made America a bigger target for terrorists. Ending the American monopoly will change the way this enterprise is viewed -- in Iraq and throughout the world.

Re-incorporate our allies. Fixing the Administration's missteps will require skilled diplomacy at the highest levels. Wes Clark recommends calling a summit of leaders from Europe, the United Nations, Japan and the Arab world to launch a new, internationalized effort in Iraq. They will be more willing to help if America works with them on issues they care about: climate change, the International Criminal Court and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Transform the military operation into a NATO operation. General Abizaid, commander of US forces in the Middle East, would remain in charge of the operation, but he would report to the NATO Council, as General Clark did as commander of NATO forces in Kosovo. With NATO support and U.N. endorsement, we can also expect some Arab countries to step in. Their presence would prove that this is not an American occupation, but an international and regional effort to stabilize Iraq.

Consider adding troops. Wes Clark believes we should look at whether adding forces will help the effort in Iraq. He would not measure success in Iraq by a reduction in troops or failure by an increase. It's more important to do the job right so all the troops can come home sooner.

Adapt to guerilla war. One mistake in Vietnam was trying to use conventional forces to fight an unconventional war. The more unarmored humvees we have, the greater our vulnerability to roadside bombs. We have suffered more losses in routine patrolling and transit than in active counter-insurgency efforts. We need to ensure the right mix of forces to fight a classic guerrilla war. That means more Special Forces and other light forces better suited for counter-insurgency.

Better use of intelligence resources. To protect our soldiers we must do all we can to find out who's attacking our soldiers. That means better intelligence work and improved relations with the civilian population. Yet intelligence specialists and people who can speak to Iraqis in their own language are scarce. We need to take the linguists and intelligence specialists now involved in the search for WMDs and assign them to our military counter-insurgency efforts. International inspectors are willing and able to take over this mission. We must also augment our intelligence capability with new technologies and better recruitment in the Arab-American community.

Train Iraqi security forces, freeing up U.S. troops. We need to empower Iraqis to provide routine security so American soldiers can focus on urgent tasks like counter-insurgency. Wes Clark would implement a comprehensive two-tier plan: train police first, then military.

Summon the old Iraqi army for duty at the local level. We need more Iraqi paramilitary units and police at the local level. General Clark will use thorough background checks, generous pay rates, and real political control for Iraqis -- as well as appealing to Iraqis' sense of nationality -- to put Iraqis in charge of basic security, freeing up US soldiers to focus on our most urgent tasks, including counter-insurgency.

Reconstitute the Iraqi Army so that it eventually can do the work the occupation force now does - guarding Iraqi borders, keeping order, and fighting insurgents. It will take considerable time to have an Iraqi Army trained enough and integrated enough to do the job.

Engage neighbors for better border security. Iraq is now a magnet for every jihadist in the Middle East. Closing the borders requires cooperation from the countries bordering Iraq. But currently, Syria and Iran don't want us to succeed because they fear they are next on our invasion list. Wes Clark recommends engaging Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia with both carrots and sticks. We have serious issues with each of these countries, but closing those borders is the most urgent priority right now. We must show Iraq's neighbors that cooperation with us is in their interest and will help their region.

Secure ammunition. Today, hundreds of thousands of tons of ammunition from Saddam's arsenal have yet to be secured, and thousands of shoulder-fired missiles remain at large. Terrorists have used these stockpiles to attack our forces. We should destroy that ammunition immediately or else secure it with surveillance technology and troops from other countries willing to come to Iraq.

Preventing Foreign Misadventures Going Forward

Promote security through multilateralism. No nation will ever have veto power over our security. But turning our back on our allies makes it harder to protect ourselves and our interests. Despite our overwhelming military, economic and political strength, we cannot pursue Arab-Israeli peace, support reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, deal with the challenges of North Korea, track down Osama bin Laden, fight the global war against terrorism, face the problem of Iran, and return to prosperity in this country, unless we have allies to help us.

Modernize international institutions to combat new threats. Wes Clark recommends pursuing a new Atlantic Charter to repair and modernize our security partnership with Europe. The Charter that will define the threats we face in common and demand action from our allies to meet them while offering a promise to act together.

Create a new agency for international assistance. Wes Clark believes America should lead the world in addressing the causes of human misery by attacking the problems of poverty, disease, and ethnic conflict with the same energy and skill we have brought to the challenge of warfare. A new agency would combine the existing development efforts of our government with a real budget for research and development, planning and the ability to draw on the new national Civilian Reserves that Wes Clark proposed in his campaign last October. These efforts will reduce the anger and alienation that gives rise to terrorism, and win us more friends and partners around the world. It will be far easier to ask gain international support for our concerns when other countries see us helping them on theirs.